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REMARKS 
Introduction to Keynote Speaker 
HON. ROBIN S. ROSENBAUM* 
I have always admired Justice Stevens as a jurist and as a person. 
But it wasn’t until I began reading about Justice Stevens’s life that I 
began to grasp just how exceptional Justice Stevens has always 
been, even as a young man. In fact, there are so many remarkable 
things about Justice Stevens that I cannot possibly do his career jus-
tice—no pun intended—in the few minutes I have. But I will try. 
Before I do, though, I wish to note that many of the facts about Jus-
tice Stevens’s life that I will be sharing with you were gathered by 
Bill Barnhart and Gene Schlickman in the book John Paul Stevens: 
An Independent Life.1 
The Honorable John Paul Stevens grew up in Chicago, the 
youngest of four boys. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the Uni-
versity of Chicago, where he studied literature; served in many ca-
pacities for the student newspaper, The Daily Maroon, including, 
among others, as the chairman, the night editor, and the sports edi-
tor; played for the school’s undefeated tennis team; and was the head 
class marshal. 
Upon obtaining his undergraduate degree, Justice Stevens re-
turned to the University of Chicago for graduate studies in English. 
The year was 1941, and a dean at school encouraged Justice Stevens 
to take a type of restricted Naval correspondence class in cryptog-
raphy. As it turned out, the Navy used the course to screen for the 
best and the brightest to serve in cryptography. In Justice Stevens, 
the Navy had found just such a man. So on December 6, 1941, Jus-
tice Stevens volunteered for the Navy.  Justice Stevens has been 
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 1 BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN 
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known to say about his timing, “I’m sure you know how the enemy 
responded the following day.” 
Justice Stevens spent nearly four years in the Navy, where he 
rose to the rank of lieutenant.  He is a recipient of the Bronze Star, a 
medal authorized by President Roosevelt in February 1944 to rec-
ognize “heroic or meritorious achievement or service” in a non-
combatant role. 
When Justice Stevens completed his military service, he decided 
to attend law school, rather than returning to his graduate studies in 
English. Justice Stevens said that his choice was “profoundly influ-
enced” by a letter that his brother Jim, who had become a lawyer in 
1938, wrote to him. Jim Stevens provided advice to Justice Stevens 
that Justice Stevens described as “hauntingly similar to that ex-
pressed in a letter written in 1761 by a young lawyer named John 
Adams: ‘Now to what higher object, to what greater character, can 
any mortal aspire than to be possessed of all this knowledge, well 
digested and ready at command, to assist the feeble and friendless 
to discountenance the haughty and lawless, to procure redress to 
wrongs, the advancement of right, to assert and maintain liberty and 
virtue, to discourage and abolish tyranny and vice?’” 
Justice Stevens attended law school at Northwestern, where he 
served as a co-editor of the law review and graduated first in his 
class. Professor W. Willard Wirtz wrote in his recommendation of 
Justice Stevens for a clerkship with Justice Wiley Blount Rutledge, 
“Stevens has the quickest, and at the same time best balanced, mind 
I have ever seen at work in a classroom. I have worked with him, 
too, in connection with 2 or 3 law review projects. The man is just 
as solid as he is brilliant. Beyond all this he has a personality which 
makes it a pure delight to work with him. I suppose that he is un-
doubtedly the most admired, and at the same time, the best liked 
man in the school.” 
Not surprisingly, Justice Rutledge seized the opportunity to have 
Justice Stevens clerk for him during the 1947-1948 Supreme Court 
term. Among other cases decided that term was Ahrens v. Clark.2  
Ahrens and about 120 other German nationals were detained at Ellis 
Island as enemies of the United States, although the fight against 
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Germany had ended.3 They filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus 
in the District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that they 
were subject to the custody and control of the Attorney General.4 
The Supreme Court concluded that they could not file their petitions 
outside the district where they were being held.5 Justice Rutledge, 
with Justice Stevens’s assistance, dissented, presciently writing “[I]f 
absence of the body from the jurisdiction is alone conclusive against 
existence of power to issue the writ, what of the case where the place 
of imprisonment, whether by private or public action, is unknown? 
What also of the situation where that place is located in one district, 
but the jailer is present in and can be served with process only in 
another? And if the place of detention lies wholly outside the terri-
torial limits of any federal jurisdiction, although the person or per-
sons exercising restraint are clearly within reach of such authority, 
is there to be no remedy . . . ?”6 
Fifty-six years later, in an interesting turn of fate, Justice 
Rutledge’s dissent in Ahrens v. Clark took a central role in Rasul v. 
Bush,7 an opinion that Justice Stevens authored. In Rasul, fourteen 
Guantanamo Bay detainees filed habeas petitions, or complaints that 
were construed as habeas petitions, against President George W. 
Bush in the District Court for the District of Columbia.8 Drawing on 
Justice Rutledge’s dissent in Ahrens, among other sources, Justice 
Stevens, joined by five other Justices, said that the petitioners’ pres-
ence was “not ‘an invariable prerequisite’ to the exercise of § 2241 
jurisdiction because habeas acts upon the person holding the pris-
oner, not the prisoner himself, so that the court acts within its re-
spective jurisdiction if the custodian can be reached by service of 
process.”9 
Following his clerkship, Justice Stevens went into private prac-
tice, eventually starting his own firm. Among Justice Stevens’s 
many interesting matters, Justice Stevens argued United States v. 
Borden Co. before the Supreme Court. He also represented Charles 
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Finley (owner of Major League Baseball’s Athletics) and helped 
Finley to move the team to Oakland from Kansas City (previously 
Philadelphia) in 1968. Somehow, during all of this work, he still 
managed to play tennis, compete at national bridge tournaments, and 
become an airplane pilot. 
According to the story as recounted by Senator Charles H. Percy, 
when Senator Percy asked Justice Stevens if he would consider ap-
pointment to the Seventh Circuit, Justice Stevens suggested check-
ing back with him in six years. But Senator Percy responded, among 
other things, “In six years, you ought to be on the Supreme Court.” 
In September 1970, Nixon appointed Justice Stevens to the Seventh 
Circuit. Justice Stevens, who was confirmed on November 20, 1970, 
was the first Seventh Circuit judge to have clerked for a Supreme 
Court justice. 
President Gerald Ford nominated Justice Stevens as an Associ-
ate Justice of the Supreme Court in 1975 to take Justice William O. 
Douglas’s seat. Justice Stevens was confirmed 98-0 and was sworn 
in on December 19, 1975. In 2006, President Ford said, “I am pre-
pared to allow history’s judgment of my term in office to rest (if 
necessary, exclusively) on my nomination thirty years ago of John 
Paul Stevens to the U.S. Supreme Court.” 
Although Justice Stevens retired from the Supreme Court in 
2010, he has kept very busy, most recently writing his book Six 
Amendments. 
We are very fortunate to have Justice Stevens with us here today 
to discuss the important symposium topic of overcriminalization. 
Commentators on the topic of overcriminalization have noted that it 
can take many different forms.  Indeed, Justice Stevens has written 
about or endorsed Supreme Court opinions addressing over-crimi-
nalization issues stemming from the actions of each of the three 
branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches. 
For example, United States v. Wells,10 decided in 1997, is an 
opinion that some have argued reflects overcriminalization on the 
part of the judiciary—as well as on the part of the executive, for 
seeking an allegedly overcriminalized construction of the statute at 
issue. There, the Supreme Court considered whether, under 18 USC 
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1014, which prohibits knowingly making a false statement to a fed-
erally insured financial institution, the false statement charged must 
be material in order to violate the statute.11 The Supreme Court de-
cided that it need not be.12 Justice Stevens dissented, explaining that 
Congress “could not have intended that someone spend up to 30 
years in prison for falsely flattering a bank officer for the purpose of 
obtaining favorable treatment.”13 
In Stewart v. McCoy,14 decided in 2002, Justice Stevens wrote 
to explain why he thought it appropriate to deny cert. This memo-
randum addressed an overcriminalization issue stemming from leg-
islative and state judicial acts.15 In Stewart, the respondent before 
the Supreme Court had been convicted under Arizona law of giving 
advice to members of a street gang.16 He was sentenced to fifteen 
years in prison.17 On habeas review, the lower federal courts ordered 
the respondent released because they concluded that his speech was 
protected under the First Amendment.18 The warden sought cert. 
Justice Stevens explained that although he viewed the lower courts’ 
conclusion that the respondent’s speech was protected under the 
First Amendment as “debateable,” he nonetheless thought that 
cert was appropriately denied because of the “harsh sentence for a 
relatively minor offense.”19 
In Kimbrough v. United States,20 decided in 2007, Justice Gins-
burg concluded on behalf of the Supreme Court that a district court 
does not abuse its discretion when it concludes in sentencing a par-
ticular defendant that the disparity between the crack cocaine and 
powder cocaine Sentencing Guidelines yields a sentence that is 
“greater than necessary” to achieve Section 3553(a)’s purposes, 
even in a mine-run case.21 While Kimbrough does not mention an 
earlier case that the Court considered, United States v. Armstrong 
                                                                                                             
 11 Id. at 484. 
 12 Id. at 499–500. 
 13 Id. at 512 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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(1996),22 there are echoes of points that Justice Stevens raised in his 
dissent in Armstrong in the Kimbrough opinion. In Armstrong, the 
Supreme Court concluded that in order to establish entitlement to 
discovery regarding selective prosecution, a defendant must produce 
credible evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races 
could have been prosecuted but were not.23 Justice Stevens dis-
sented, asserting that the court’s inherent power gives it the author-
ity to require the government to respond to what the court deems a 
sufficient factual showing of selective prosecution.24 The crime at 
issue in Armstrong involved crack cocaine.25 Justice Stevens ex-
plained, in his view, the district judge’s order “should be evaluated 
in light of three circumstances that underscore the need for judicial 
vigilance over certain types of drug prosecutions. First, the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and subsequent legislation established a 
regime of extremely high penalties for the possession and distribu-
tion of so-called crack cocaine . . . .Second, the disparity between 
the treatment of crack cocaine and powder cocaine is matched by 
the disparity between the severity of the punishment imposed by 
federal law and that imposed by state law for the same con-
duct . . . .Finally, it is undisputed that the brunt of the elevated fed-
eral penalties falls heavily on blacks . . . .The extraordinary severity 
of the imposed penalties and the troubling racial patterns of enforce-
ment give rise to a special concern about the fairness of charging 
practices for crack offenses.”26 These concerns that Justice Stevens 
expressed in his Armstrong dissent are essentially the same as those 
that later justified the Court’s opinion in Kimbrough. 
Justice Stevens is indeed a living legend, and we are very lucky 
to have him here with us today. Without further ado, it is my honor 
and privilege to introduce the Honorable John Paul Stevens. 
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